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1. Introduction
The only sentence in (1) conveys two propositions: the exclusive proposition that
nobody other than the Red Sox can beat the Yankees and the prejacent proposition
that the Red Sox can beat the Yankees.
(1) Only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees.
Several theories of the meaning of only have been suggested in the literature: these
theories, while agreeing on the analysis of the exclusive proposition, disagree on
the status of the prejacent. The objective of this paper is to assess the merits and
problems of these theories and to sketch an alternative proposal that I will argue
solves some of the problems raised by the previous theories. A more extensive
discussion of the issues presented in this paper can be found in Ippolito (2007).
2. The Problem of the Entailment Analysis
According to the entailment analysis, proposed by Atlas (1993) among others, the
sentence in (1) asserts both the exclusive and the prejacent propositions. This anal-
ysis does account for the fact that neither proposition can be straightforwardly de-
nied, as shown in (2).
(2) a. #Only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees, and/but the Blue Jays can
too.
b. #Only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees, and/but they can’t either.
However, the parallelism breaks down in negative sentences: while the exclusive
proposition behaves like a true entailment, the prejacent does not.
(3) a. Not only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees. Therefore, somebody
other than the Red Sox can. The Blue Jays can too.
b. Not only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees. Therefore, the Red Sox
can.
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On the basis of the asymmetry in (3), it seems reasonable to maintain that the two
propositions are not equal and, more specifically, that the prejacent is not an en-
tailment of the sentence. In particular, the behavior of the prejacent under negation
suggests that it is a presupposition.
3. The Problem of the Strong Presupposition Analysis
According to what I will label the ‘strong presupposition’ analysis, (1) asserts that
nobody other than the Red Sox can beat the Yankees, and presupposes that the Red
Sox can. Because presuppositions project under negation (negation is a ‘hole’ in
Karttunen’s terminology), the asymmetry in (3) is explained.
Even though this analysis is appealing, it faces some challanges. The first
problem, observed already by Horn (1996) and more recently by Geurts and van der
Sandt (2004), is that, contrary to the standard behavior of presuppositions (see 4b,
the prejacent does not project in modalized only sentences: for example, in (4) the
speaker is not committed to the truth of the proposition that the Red Sox can beat
the Yankees.
(4) a. It is possible that only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees, and maybe
not even they can.
b. It is possible that John will regret having smoked, #and maybe he never
smoked.
The second problem, observed again by Horn (1996), is based on the obser-
vation that the following question-answer exchange is felicitous.
(5) A: Who can beat the Yankees?
B: Only [the Red Sox]F .
If the only statement presupposed that the Red Sox can beat the Yankees, then B’s
answer would be presupposing something that A does not know. Since what is
presupposed is taken to be common ground between the participants in the conver-
sation, the following move is expected to cause infelicity. Indeed, when we con-
sider standard instances of presuppositions, this expectation is met. The following
exchange is quite odd.
(6) A: Is John married?
B: #His wife is a doctor.
The comparison between (5) and (6) suggests that the prejacent is not a presuppo-
sition.
A defender of the strong presupposition analysis might suggest that (6) is
worse than (5) because B’s assertion in the former is irrelavant to the question (the
presupposition being a partial answer), whereas B’s assertion in the latter is in fact a
partial answer to the question. While this difference is real, I don’t think it explains
the contrast in judgement between (5) and (6). To see this, consider the following
pair.
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(7) a. A: Did the Red Sox beat anyone?
B: #It is the Yankees that they beat.
b. A: Did the Red Sox beat anyone?
B: They beat the Yankees.
The difference between (7a) and (7b) does not lie in what kind of information the
two answers convey, but in how this information is conveyed in the two cases: the
proposition that the Red Sox beat someone is conveyed by both answers but, while
it is presupposed in the infelicitous (7a), it is asserted in (7b).
4. The Weak Presupposition Analysis
Horn (1996) and more recently Geurts and van der Sandt (2004) have suggested
variants of the presupposition analysis. Here I will abstract away from their differ-
ences and I will collect these theories under the label “weak presupposition analy-
sis”. According to these theories, only is a presupposition trigger but the presuppo-
sition that it triggers is an existential proposition. For example, the presupposition
triggered by only in our familiar example is that someone can beat the Yankees.
(8) Only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees.
≫ Someone can beat the Yankees.
Since the assertion is the exclusive proposition that nobody other than the Red Sox
can beat the Yankees, it follows from the assertion together with the existential
presupposition that the Red Sox can beat the Yankees.
The weak presupposition analysis, however, does not clearly resolve the
problems faced by the strong presupposition analysis: (i) the lack of projection
in modal sentences is still unaccounted for, and (ii) the felicity of (5) would be
explained by assuming that the question Who can beat the Yankees? presupposes
that someone can beat the Yankees, an assumption controversial at best.
Moreover, the weak presupposition analysis faces its own problems. First,
as independently also observed by Rooij and Schulz (2005), an only sentence with
a conjoined NP in focus, such as (9), only presupposes that someone can beat the
Yankees.
(9) Only [the Red Sox and the Blue Jays]F can beat the Yankees.
Since the assertion is that nobody other than the Red Sox and the Blue Jays can
beat the Yankees, it does not follow that both the red Sox and the Blue Jays can,
and therefore we can’t explain the prejacent.
Second, the weak presupposition analysis cannot account for why asserting
a negative only sentences commits the speaker to the truth of the prejacent. Consider
(10).
(10) Not only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees.
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The sentence asserts that someone other than the Red Sox can beat the Yankees, and
presupposes that someone can beat the Yankees. It does not follows from assertion
and presupposition together that the Red Sox can beat the Yankees. Why then upon
hearing (10) are we committed to the prejacent? Geurts and van der Sandt (2004)
are aware of this problem and, in order to solve it, propose that the prejacent in (10)
is a conversational implicature arising from a competition with the sentence JohnF
cannot speak French.1 However, their solution is highly problematic: it predicts
that, while the prejacent is not cancellable in a positive only sentence (it follows
from the assertion and the presupposition together), it should be cancellable in a
negative only sentence since it is a mere implicature. As the following pair shows,
this result is incorrect.
(11) a. Only [the Red Sox and the Blue Jays]F can beat the Yankees, and maybe
not even they can.
b. #Not only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees, and in fact the Red Sox
can’t.
The situation is reversed: the prejacent is cancellable in the positive sentence, but
not in the negative.
5. The Implicature Analysis is Problematic Too
McCawley (1981) proposed that the prejacent is a conversational implicature. Let
us go back to our familiar example.
(12) Only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees.
The idea is the following. When a speaker utters (12), she is asserting that nobody
other than the Red Sox can beat the Yankees. If she knew that the Red Sox cannot
beat the Yankees, she should have said so by uttering the sentence Nobody can beat
the Yankees. Assuming that she is knowledgable on the issue of who can beat the
Yankees, her utterance must mean that she knows that the Red Sox can beat the
Yankees. More recently, a version of the implicature analysis has been defended by
Rooij and Schulz (2005).
The main objection that implicature accounts of the prejacent face is that,
while conversational inferences of positive sentences do not remain when these
sentences are negated (see (13)), the prejacent of an only sentence does.
(13) a. John has two children.
John has exactly two children.
b. John deosn’t have two children.
John has exactly two children.
1See Geurts and van der Sandt (2004) for the details of how this implicature is derived.
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The appeal of the implicature analysis is that it explains why a positive only
sentence Even though interesting, a simple implicature analysis does not work. In
what follows I will present my own proposal, which is developed in greater detail
in Ippolito (2007).
6. The Proposal
The particle only associates with focus. Following Rooth (1992) and Rooth (1996),
I take focus to introduce a set of alternative propositions in a presuppositional way,
according to the definition in the ∼ operator (see 14).
(14) Where ϕ is a syntactic phrase and C is a syntactically covert semantic vari-
able, ϕ ∼C introduces the presupposition that C is a subset of [[ϕ]] f contain-
ing [[ϕ]]o and at least one other element.2
When we apply this semantics to only, the sentence Only the Red Sox can beat the
Yankees comes out with the following structure.
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What is the contribution of only to the truth conditions of the sentence? We want the
sentence to assert that for all propositions p in C, where C is a contextually salient
set of alternative propositions of the form x can beat the Yankees, if p is true then it
is entailed by the proposition that the red Sox can beat the Yankees. In order to do
so, I will adopt the Roothian semantics for focus, but contrary to Rooth I will not
take the prejacent to be a presupposition triggered by only. Here is the meaning of
the adverb.
(16) [[only]]w = λC : C ⊂ [[ϕ]] f and [[ϕ]]o ∈C and | C |≥ 2. λ p. ∀q ∈ C(q(w) =
1→ (p→ q))
Let us go back to our sentence, repeated in (17), and let us suppose that C is
constituted by the set {the Red Sox can beat the Yankees; the Blue Jays can beat the
Yankees; the Orioles can beat the Yankees; the Devil Rays can beat the Yankees},
closed under conjunction.3
(17) Only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees.
2[[α]]o denotes the semantic value of the phrase α , whereas [[α]] f denotes its focus value.
3Let us also suppose that the proposition that the Yankees can beat the Yankees cannot be in-
cluded in C.
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My proposal is that only does trigger a presupposition, but the presupposition it
triggers is neither the prejacent that the Red Sox can beat the Yankees nor the exis-
tential presupposition that someone can beat the Yankees. Instead, it is the “scalar”
presupposition in (18): if any proposition in C is true, then the proposition in the
scope of only is true.
(18) Only presupposition (where ϕ is its complement):
∀q ∈C(q(w) = 1→ [[ϕ]]w = 1)
Applied to our example, the presupposition is that if any proposition in C is true,
then it is true that the Red Sox can beat the Yankees. In other words, if any salient
alternative to the Red Sox can beat the Yankees, then the Red Sox can.
The truth conditions for (17) will then look as follows.
(19) [[Only(C) [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees ∼C]]R,w is defined only
if:
(1) R(5)⊂ [[The Red Sox can beat the Yankees]] f and [[The red Sox can
beat the Yankees]]w ∈ R() and |R(5)| ≥ 2 (focus presupposition)
(2) ∀q ∈ R(5)(q(w) = 1→ [[The Red Sox can beat the Yankees]]w = 1)
If defined, [[Only(C) [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees ∼C]]R,w
=1 if ¬∃q ∈ R(5) : q(w) = 1∧ [[The Red Sox can beat the Yankees]]w 6→ q
=0 if ∃q ∈ R(5) : q(w) = 1∧ [[The Red Sox can beat the Yankees]]w 6→ q
The sentence will be defined and true in worlds where only the Red Sox can beat the
Yankees; defined and false in worlds where the Red Sox and some other (relevant)
team can beat the Red Sox; undefined in worlds where some other (relevant) team
can beat the Yankees but the Red Sox can’t.
6.1. Deriving the Prejacent
With these truth conditions in hand, we can now add the last piece to the picture:
the prejacent follows from a conversational implicature. Assuming that everybody
in conversation is following the Gricean maxims, the implicature will be generated
as follows. A speaker who, in a context where it is relevant to know who can beat
the Yankees, utters the sentence Only the Red Sox can beat the Yankees instead of
the more informative (stronger/asymetrically entailing) Nobody can beat the Yan-
kees, will be understood as not being in a position to utter the stronger statement.
Assuming that the speaker is competent about the subject, she will be understood
as intending to communicate that the stronger statement is false, i.e. that there is
someone who can beat the Yankees. This is the implicature. Now, since she as-
serted that nobody other that the Red Sox can, it must be that she believes that it is
the Red Sox who can beat the Yankees. This is the prejacent.
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7. Solving the Problems Raised by the Previous Theories
In this section I will consider the problems raised against the previous theories of
the meaning of only and I will show that the current analysis, which combines
elements of the presupposition and the implicature analyses, does not run into the
same difficulties.
7.1. Cancellability of the Prejacent in Positive ‘Only’ Sentences
Recall one of the objections to both the strong and the weak presupposition analy-
ses: neither the prejacent nor the existential presupposition seem to project in modal
sentences.
(20) It is possible that only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees, and maybe not
even they can.
As we observed above, the speaker is not committed to the truth of the prejacent nor
to the truth of the proposition that someone can beat the Yankees. In the analysis
that I am proposing, this is no longer a problem since the prejacent is a conversa-
tional implicature and, as such, cancellable. All that is expected to project is the
conditional presupposition that if anyone can beat the Yankees, that’s the Red Sox.
7.2. The Prejacent in Negative ‘Only’ Sentences
Above we saw that the present analysis, just like the implicature analysis sketched
in Section 5, scores better than the presupposition analyses with respect to the can-
cellability of the prejacent in positive sentences. However, implicature analyses are
too weak and cannot explain why the prejacent remains in a negative only sentence.
The current analysis does not face this problem and it predicts that the prejacent
should remain in a negative sentence. Here is why. Consider an utterance of the
sentence in 21.
(21) Not only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees.
This sentence carries the presupposition that if anybody can beat the Yankees, the
Red Sox can, as shown below.
(22) ∀q ∈C[q(w) = 1→ J[The Red Sox]F can beat the YankeesKw = 1).
Moreover, (21) asserts that there is a proposition in C that is true and not entailed
by the proposition that the Red Sox can beat the Yankees. Because (21) can be true
only if (22) is true, if (21) is true, then it follows that the Red Sox and someone
other than the Red Sox can beat the Yankees, which entails that the Red Sox can
beat the Yankees (the prejacent).
The analysis correctly explains the cancellation data discussed in Section 4
and repeated below.
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(23) a. Only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees, and maybe not even they can.
b. #Not only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees, and in fact the Red Sox
can’t.
Recall that the fact that the prejacent is cancellable in a positive only sentence but
not in a negative one was problematic for all types of analyses discussed before.
The strong and weak presupposition analyses had trouble with the cancellability
of the prejacent in the positive sentence and Geurts and van der Sandt’s proposed
solution did not help explain why the prejacent is not cancellable in a negative only
sentence. As for the implicature analyses, they faced the problem of explaining
why a negative only sentence carries the truth of the prejacent.
The present analysis, on the other hand, correctly account for (23): the preja-
cent is cancellable in the positive sentence because it follows from a conversational
implicature; it is not cancellable in the negative sentence because it is entailed by
the assertion and the presupposition together.
7.3. Conjoined NPs in Focus
The current analysis can also explain the prejacent in only sentences where a con-
joined NP is in focus. In (24) I repeat the example we considered before.
(24) Only [the Red Sox and the Blue Jays]F can beat the Yankees.
The prejacent (the Red Sox and the Blue Jays can beat the Yankees) is a conversa-
tional scalar implicature, derived as follows. Imagine that a speaker, who is sup-
posed to be following the Gricean maxims, were to utter (24). Because they are
both more informative (asymmetrically entailing), she should have uttered either
Only the Red Sox can beat the Yankees or Only the Blue Jays can beat the Yankees.
The fact that she did not must mean that she was not in a position to make either
stronger claim. Assuming that she is knowledgeable about who can beat the Yan-
kees, this means that she believes that either stronger statement is false, i.e. that
there is someone other than the Red Sox who can beat the Yankees and there is
someone other than the Blue Jays who can too. Since she asserted that nobody
other than the Red Sox and the Blue Jays can beat the Yankees, she must believe
that only the Red Sox and the Blue Jays can.
8. Some Apparent Puzzles
When we discussed the truth conditions in Section 6, we noticed that the proposal
correctly predicts that the sentence Only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees will
be defined and true in a world where the Red Sox and nobody else can beat the
Yankees; will be defined and false in a world where the Red Sox and somebody
else can beat the Yankees; will be undefined if someone other than the Red Sox,
but not the Red Sox, can beat the Yankees. Consider now a world where nobody
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can beat the Yankees (or, better, consider a context set entailing that nobody can
beat the Yankees). Does our proposal account for the intuition that the sentence is
infelicitous?
(25) Context: Nobody can beat the Yankees.
#Only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees.
At first, it would seem that this context creates a problem for the analysis: the
presupposition carried by the only sentence (“if there is a proposition in C that is
true, then it is true that the Red Sox can beat the Yankees”) seems true (since the
antecedent is false) and the sentence should come out as defined and true, contrary
to the judgment in (25). Is this a real problem? I will call this “ point 1”.
“Point 2” is the following. We said so far that the prejacent of a positive only
sentence is cancellable. However, one important observation is that cancelling it
requires the use of an epistemic operator, e.g. the modal adverbs maybe or perhaps.
As the pair below shows, cancelling the prejacent by simply denying it gives rise to
a contradictory discourse.
(26) a. #Only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees; in fact, not even they can.
b. Only [the Red Sox]F can beat the Yankees, and maybe not even they can.
This is unexpected since conversational implicatures are not subject to this con-
strained.
(27) The Red Sox won some games; in fact, all.
In what follows I will suggest that points 1 and 2 are related and that the proposal I
have defended does explain both.
Reconsider the presupposition triggered by only in the sentence Only the
Red Sox can beat the Yankees.
(28) ∀q ∈C[q(w) = 1→ J[The Red Sox]F can beat the YankeesKw = 1)
Assuming that a proposition expressed by a sentence S is the set of possible worlds
where S is true, adding the proposition in (28) to the context set (the set of all
possible worlds where all the propositions in the common ground are true) amounts
to ruling out worlds where somebody other than the Red Sox (e.g. the Blue Jays)
can beat the Yankees but the Red Sox cannot. Therefore, after adding (28) to the
context set, this latter will contain: (i) worlds where the Red Sox can beat the
Yankees and nobody else can; (ii) worlds where the Red Sox and somebody else
(e.g. the Blue Jays) can beat the Yankees; (iii) worlds where nobody can beat the
Yankees. The context set is an idealized representation of a state of information, that
is the information that the participants in the conversation share. Let us make the
assumption that you can represent the likelihood of a proposiiton quantitatively, i.e.
a proposition p is more likely than a proposition q in a particular context set iff there
are more p-worlds than q-worlds in the context set. Applied to our presupposition,
it follows that when the speaker presupposes (28), she is presupposing that the Red
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Sox are more likely than any other team (in the relevant set) to be able to beat the
Yankees.
Now, assume a model such that if a proposition is certain, then it gets prob-
ability 1, and if a proposition is impossible, then it gets probability 0. If the proba-
bility that the Red Sox can beat the Yankees is greater than the probability that any
other (relevant) team can beat the Yankees, then the probability that the Red Sox
can beat the Yankees must be greater than 0. Therefore, it must be at least possible
that the Red Sox can beat the Yankees. In other words, the presupposition that the
Red Sox are more likely than any other (relevant) team to beat the Yankees entails
that they can beat the Yankees.
We are now in a position to explain now the pair in (26). Take the infelici-
tous discourse in (26a): in order for the context to be successfully updated with the
sentence Only the Red Sox can beat the Yankees, it must entails the presupposition
that the Red Sox are more likely than the other (relevant) teams to beat the Yankees,
and, therefore, that it is possible that they can beat the Yankees. However, the sus-
pender clause asserts that it is not possible that the Red Sox can beat the Yankkes,
giving rise to a contradictory. In (26b), instead, no contradiction arises thanks to the
modal adverb maybe. The presupposition entails that it is possible that the Red Sox
can beat the Yankees and this is perfectly compatible with the suspender’s assertion
that it is possible that they can’t.
The infelicity of (25) also follows: since the only sentence presupposes that
it is possible that the Red Sox can beat the Yankees, this presupposition can never be
satisfied in a context entailing that nobody can beat the Yankees, and the sentence
cannot be added to it.
9. Conclusion and Remaining Issues
In this paper I have reviewed some of the objections to the entailment analysis, the
strong presupposition analysis, the weak presupposition analysis, and the implica-
ture analysis. The view of the meaning of only that I have defended here builds on
work by Rooth (1992) and Rooth (1996), among others, and shares with most view
of only defended previously the idea that the assertion of a sentence of the form
Only [A]F is B is the exclusive proposition that all true propositions (in the relevant
set) are entailed by the proposition that A is B. What is different is the mechanism
explaining the nature of the prejacent. The proposal that I have defended here ar-
gues that: (i) only is a presupposition trigger, but that the presupposition it triggers
is a “scalar” presupposition according to which if any proposition in the relevant
set is true, then it is true that A is B; (ii) the prejacent in a positive only sentence
is a conversational implicature, and as such cancellable; (iii) given the semantics
that I proposed, a negative only sentence entails the prejacent, which explains the
apparent presuppositional behavior of the prejacent and the fact that the prejacent
can’t be cancelled in the negative sentence; (iv) we showed that the puzzling fact
that it is not possible to cancel the prejacent by denying it follows from the pro-
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posal, and that adding a modal operator like maybe is required in order to avoid the
contradiction and rescue the sentence.
Open questions remain, however, and among the puzzling facts that still
need explaining is the observation made and discussed in Ippolito (2007) that can-
celling the prejacent seems easier with modal and, more generally, gradable predi-
cates.
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